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In general, the art of government consists of taking as much 
money as possible from one class of  citizens to give to the other. 
Voltaire (1764) 
People who think the mighty in Washington can be persuaded, or 
corrupted, if you will, by anything less than votes just don’t under- 
stand what it’s all about and never will. They don’t know what 
Washington juice is made of. 
George E. Allen (1950) 
The elderly of today are much wealthier than the elderly of the past, not just 
because rising compensation has made financing retirement consumption eas- 
ier, but also because the elderly have benefited from a redistribution of public- 
sector resources. Total public-sector expenditures have increased in real dollar 
terms, and the fraction of those expenditures consumed by the elderly has in- 
creased. Although  programs  aimed at the elderly  greatly  mitigated  old-age 
poverty  and therefore have obvious merits, these programs have rapidly  be- 
come extremely expensive and have displaced other expenditures, including 
education. 
This chapter investigates the growth of three different programs aimed at 
the aged: the Union army pension program, state old-age assistance programs, 
and Social Security Old Age Insurance. These programs share certain common 
features: they  grew rapidly  from very  modest beginnings;  their growth was 
spurred  in  part  by  increasingly  well-organized  pressure  groups;  and  their 
growth was made possible by the availability of revenue sources that could be 
tapped to finance them. By examining the history  of these programs we can 
learn what the political pressures facing Social Security in the future are likely 
to be. 
8.1  Union Army Pensions 
At the beginning of the century Union army pensions were the most wide- 
spread form of assistance to the elderly. In 1910 an estimated 25 percent of the 
population older than sixty-four benefited from the program, receiving either 
veterans’ or widows’ benefits.’ In contrast, a relatively small percentage of the 
population older than sixty-four received either public or private assistance. In 
Massachusetts,  only 3 percent  of those older than sixty-four received  either 
public or private poor relief, and another 3 percent were in almshouses or pri- 
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vate homes. Although the relative size of the elderly population was increas- 
ing-from  3 percent in 1880 to 4 percent in 1910-unlike  Union army veter- 
ans the elderly were not a well-organized group. Unlike the group of men who 
had defended the Union they did not elicit as much public sympathy. 
The Union army pension program was  originally a modest undertaking, 
serving only severely disabled soldiers and the dependents of soldiers who had 
died from wartime causes. When the program was instituted in 1862, the most 
that an enlisted man could receive for total disability was $8.00 per month, an 
amount equivalent to 30 percent of the earnings of an unskilled laborer. The 
program was soon liberalized. Congress raised the pension for total disability 
to $20.00 per month in  1866 and to $24.00 in 1872, the latter a sum that re- 
placed 76 percent of the monthly earnings of an unskilled laborer. The defini- 
tion of total disability was liberalized as well. The sum of $24.00 was given to 
those unfit for any manual labor, even lighter kinds. Another disability category 
was therefore created, and by  1873 those who were so disabled as to require 
the regular aid and attendance of another person received $31.25 per month. 
The sums of $31.25 and $24.00 per month were soon increased and by  1883 
had risen  to  $72.00 and $30.00 per month, respectively. When  the rate  of 
$30.00 per month was established, it almost completely replaced the income 
of a laborer. Veterans and their dependents also greatly benefited from the pas- 
sage of the Arrears Act of  1879, which permitted those who had failed to file 
a pension claim to collect back payments in a lump sum.2 
With the act of 27 June 1890 the number of beneficiaries increased dramati- 
cally. Any  disability, even one not related to military service, now entitled a 
veteran to a pension of $6.00-$12.00 per month. Interpreting old age as a dis- 
ability, the Pension Bureau granted the maximum rate to those seventy-five 
years of age or older and the minimum rate to those at least sixty-five years of 
age. Dependents of a veteran who had died from any cause became eligible for 
pensions. The number of pensioners on the rolls almost doubled between 1889 
and 1892. In 1904 old-age provisions were further liberalized, with the Pension 
Bureau granting applicants pensions of  $6.00, $8.00, $10.00, and $12.00 per 
month at ages sixty-two, sixty-five, sixty-eight, and seventy, respectively. Age- 
based pension amounts were increased once more in  1907, when Congress 
granted pensions of  $12.00 per month to those aged sixty-two to sixty-nine, 
$15.00 per month to those aged seventy to seventy-four, and $20.00 per month 
to those older than seventy-four. The next major pension law, that of  11 May 
1912, established a system in which rates rose with both age and length of 
service. Pension ratings for  age  and  service were  increased  automatically 
after 1912. 
8.1.1  Politics 
The increasing generosity of  the Union  army  pension  program  was  ex- 
tremely costly. Total real costs of the program rose sharply with the passage of 
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neglected to file a pension claim to collect a lump-sum pension in back pay- 
ments. Real costs and the total number of pensioners then skyrocketed with 
the passage of the 1890 law, and in  1893 Union army pensions consumed 43 
percent of all federal expenditures. That such a large fraction of outlays should 
be spent on a single program is unusual. The Social Security program today 
consumes only 21 percent of all federal outlays. Although the total number of 
pensioners began to decline after 1906, the passage of the 1907 and 1912 laws 
increased the costs of the programs and kept them high (see fig. 8.1). 
The federal government was able to finance a program of this magnitude 
because, between  1866 and 1920, the federal budget registered  a budget sur- 
plus for thirty-seven years. This surplus was distributed to veterans and their 
dependents. James Tanner, a disabled veteran appointed commissioner of pen- 
sions in 1888, reportedly stated, “I will drive a six-mule team through the Trea- 
sury,” and, “God help the surplus” (quoted in Glasson 1918a, 226). 
High tariffs on imports produced the federal budget surplus. The high tariffs 
of the Civil War years were never effectively lowered and were kept high by 
the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890 and the Dingley Tariff Act in 
1897, which raised customs duties above 50 percent. Between  1866 and the 
passage in 1913 of the constitutional amendment granting Congress the power 
to tax incomes, close to half  of  all federal revenues came from tariffs. The 
other half originated from excise taxes. Veterans lobbied vigorously to main- 
tain tariffs at high levels. Assuming that tariffs would have been lower in the 
absence of such lobbying, then, because tariffs were a regressive tax, the costs 
of the program were borne by the poor and by groups who did not benefit from 
the  Union  army  pension  program,  such  as southerners,  recent  immigrants, 
and younger cohorts. This was well recognized  by contemporaries. Glasson 
(191 8a, 238) wrote, “To a large extent the necessities and comforts of the poor 
were taxed and the resulting funds paid out in gratuities to persons who were 
better off than a large proportion of the taxpayers.” 
Behind the enactment of this large-scale redistributive program was a major 
lobbying effort on the part of veterans, pension  lawyers, and tariff interests. 
Soon after the war’s end, the survivors of the war organized the Grand Army 
of the Republic (GAR). GAR outposts were present in most counties, and after 
188  1 the GAR was regularly represented in Washington during the sessions of 
Congress. After 1883, the commander in chief of the GAR would appoint an- 
nually a committee of five known as the Committee on Pensions to lobby Con- 
gress. Pension attorneys, who earned a fixed fee each time a veteran filed for a 
pension, were allied with the GAR. George E. Lemon, a leading pension law- 
yer, started his pro-pension  program newspaper, the National Tribune, in 1877. 
The newspaper experienced a rapid growth in circulation, and Lemon was still 
publishing it in 1916. In addition to printing articles of a historical and literary 
nature and advertisements for Lemon’s business, the newspaper ran editorials 
championing the  expansion  of  the  pension  program.  Other  claims  agents 
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Fig. 8.1  Total number of pensioners, real costs of pension program, and pension program 
as percentage of all federal expenditures, 1865-1920 
Note: Compiled from Glasson (1918a: 273), the US.  Bureau of Pensions  1920 Report of the Commissioner of 
Pensions, and table Y 335-338 in US.  Bureau of the Census (1975, 1104). 164  Chapter8 
literature and letters throughout the country on behalf of new pension bills. 
The newspapers of claims agents gave their editorial space freely to arguments 
that ex-soldiers ought to fight the proposals of the Free Traders to lower tariffs 
because otherwise there would be no surplus available for pensions. 
Pensions were a very important political issue. Each major political party 
included Civil War pension proposals in their national party platforms. At an 
1888 meeting of the Grand Army of the Republic, when that organization was 
lobbying for a disability pension program, a member of  Congress recounted 
how he had won his seat: “The gallant General Harvey of  Indiana, Captain 
White of  Fort Wayne, and myself represent three districts in Indiana, and in 
each of those districts the majority against us is from twelve to fifteen hundred. 
We held a council of war. We declared in favor of universal pension. Our oppo- 
nents were foolish enough to fall into the trap and opposed it. Harvey carried 
his district by fourteen hundred majority, Captain White camed his by  over 
twelve hundred, and I carried mine by eleven hundred and fifty.” At the same 
meeting another speaker said, “We have a presidential election, and I tell you 
that there is a power behind that. I am no prophet, but I would predict that a 
President who will again veto a disability Pension Bill can never be reelected 
President of the United States” (both quoted in Glasson  1918a, 205, 206). In 
fact, Grover Cleveland, who as president had vetoed a pension bill that would 
have given pensions to disabled, needy veterans, lost in 1888 to Benjamin Har- 
rison, who promptly signed the 1890 act providing pensions to all disabled sol- 
diers. 
Both Republicans and Democrats used the pension system to gain political 
support. For example, the commissioner of pensions in the first Cleveland ad- 
ministration was charged with filling the Pension Bureau with Democrats and 
increasing pension allowances and payments in areas with either a strong core 
of Democratic support or a concentration of  veterans (Glasson  1918a, 224). 
Logue’s (1992) statistical  analysis  shows that,  in the mid-l880s, the more 
Democratic the county, the greater the proportion of pensioners, whereas in 
the early 1880s, under a Republican administration, the more Republican the 
county, the greater the proportion of pensioners. 
After 1895, the administration of pensions grew more professional. The pen- 
sion laws’ increasing generosity made the granting of political favors through 
the pension  system almost impossible. Almost everyone was  already on the 
rolls. In the pension records used in this research there is no statistical evidence 
that pension amount varied according to the strength of either the Republican 
or the Democratic  Party  in the county of  the pensioner’s residence  (Costa 
1993). Pensions did, however, still remain a political issue. Although the pen- 
sion system could no longer benefit specific subgroups of  the elderly, veteran 
population, elderly veterans as a group could still benefit. 
8.1.2  A Lasting Legacy? 
The first experiment with a disability and old-age pension program in the 
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been the hope of social reformers that Union army pensions would prove to be 
“a very important entering wedge for a national system of old age pensions.” 
According to their calculations the rapid decline in the number of  surviving 
veterans meant that, “a large appropriation will, therefore automatically be- 
come available, which will permit the establishment of a national old age pen- 
sion scheme without even any material disturbance” (Rubinow  1916, 409). 
This was not to be. Although the federal government ran a budget surplus from 
1920 to 1930, the few state-provided old-age pensions that were established 
were set up by individual states, not the federal government. A question that 
scholars have tried to answer is why the Union army pension program did not 
lead to national old-age pensions. 
It has sometimes been argued that the revulsion of the elite and of the middle 
class against Union army pensions retarded the growth of a national old-age 
pension scheme until the New Deal.3  According to this view, one part of  the 
legacy of the Union army pension program was the fear that individual cases 
would be decided on the basis of fraudulent documents or political cronyism 
and a distrust of government administration of any pension program. But all 
social programs, including the old outdoor poor relief system and the present 
Social Security retirement and disability system, have been criticized on the 
grounds of abuse. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Civil War pen- 
sions were criticized as well. Some fraud undoubtedly did exist, but, by  the 
time most old-age programs were being debated, the Civil War pension system 
had already been professionalized. As discussed in appendix A at the end of 
the book, the pension records themselves provide no evidence that corruption 
was common. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics predicted nei- 
ther pension amount nor the ratings of  the examining surgeons. Those who 
were in worse health, as measured by  such objective criteria as the BMI or 
subsequent mortality, received higher pensions. 
If  perceived corruption was on such a grand scale as to inspire widespread 
disgust, why did social reformers at the beginning of the century deliberately 
draw analogies between Civil War and old-age pensions? They boldly asked, 
“The nation and the states have already declared it to be our duty to shelter the 
aged and wounded soldier, why should the victims of the ‘army of labor’ be 
neglected? They have also served their country in occupations even more dan- 
gerous and destructive than war, and quite as useful” (Henderson 1909, 286). 
At the end of the 1920s, when interest in old-age pensions had revived, social 
reformers were still writing about Union army pensions, pointing out that our 
experience with them showed that old-age pensions did not corrupt the recipi- 
ents and their families (Epstein 1928, 184). 
It is true that the Union army pension program did not immediately serve as 
an entering wedge for a system of  national old-age pensions. This is more 
likely to have resulted from factors other than widespread disgust with Union 
army pensions. One of these must be the lack of  political organization on the 
part of the elderly. Without organization, their numbers were simply too few 
for them to be an effective voting block. In contrast, countries where the el- 166  Chapter8 
derly represented a larger share of the population had greater expenditures on 
pensions (Lindert 1994). Another factor must be that a system of national old- 
age pensions would have been far more costly than the Union army pension 
program. Total expenditures on Union army pensions to veterans, widows, and 
their dependents equaled $150,959,327 in 1910. Had this amount been redis- 
tributed to all men and women age sixty-five or older, each individual would 
have only received $38.00 per year, whereas the average payment to veterans, 
wives, widows, and other dependents over age sixty-four was $152 per year. 
One possibility would have been to redistribute the money to the poorest 25 
percent of  the elderly population, but this may not have been feasible politi- 
cally. In a country such as the United States, where the middle class is more 
closely  allied,  economically  and  spiritually, with the upper  than the  lower 
classes, the poorest 25 percent of the elderly would not necessarily elicit the 
compassion needed to give them special claims on the public purse. 
8.2  Pensions and the States 
The first universal old-age pensions were state, not federal, programs? One 
of the first bills introduced in a state legislature was in Massachusetts in 1903, 
but, like so many old-age pension bills, it was not passed. In 1915 both Arizona 
and Alaska enacted old-age pension laws, but the Arizona law was declared 
unconstitutional. No further laws were enacted until 1923, when old-age pen- 
sion laws were passed in Nevada, Montana, and Pennsylvania. The Pennsylva- 
nia law was found unconstitutional, and only in 1931 did that state pass a con- 
stitutional amendment permitting the enactment of old-age pension laws. In 
1923 the residents of Ohio defeated a state referendum proposing the institu- 
tion of old-age pensions. From 1925 to 1926 old-age pension laws were passed 
in Wisconsin, Kentucky, Maryland, and Colorado. A California pension law 
was passed by the state legislature in 1925 but vetoed by the governor. Califor- 
nia, together with Wisconsin, enacted the first statewide mandatory laws in 
1929. Utah enacted an old-age pension law in  1929 as well, but in that year 
legislation failed to win approval in either house of thirteen state legislatures. 
States that had pension programs by  1929 were nonsouthern and tended to 
have relatively small elderly populations. In 1930 old-age pension laws were 
passed in Massachusetts and New York. In  1931 old-age pension bills were 
pending in thirty-eight states and were passed in Delaware, Idaho, New Hamp- 
shire, New Jersey, and West Virginia. Pension laws were enacted in Arizona, 
Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylva- 
nia, Washington, and Hawaii in 1933, far more than had been passed in any 
previous year. In  1934, Iowa passed an old-age pension law, and the laws of 
Maryland, Washington, and Minnesota were made mandatory. By the end of 
1934 twenty-eight states and two territories had established old-age pension 
laws. Those states that established pension programs between 1930 and 1934 
were again nonsouthern but this time tended to have relatively large elderly 
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The typical state old-age pension program was of  limited scope. Although 
some states provided pensions to those age sixty-five or older, most provided 
pensions only to those age seventy or older. The maximum annual pension 
was generally between $300 and $365 per year, or 32 percent of average 1933 
earnings of full-time employees, but was as low as $150 in North Dakota and 
as high as $420 in Alaska. Only those who had resided in the state for a long 
period of time, generally fifteen years, were eligible. The recipient was prohib- 
ited from earning more than a given amount per year, generally between $300 
and $365. He was also usually prohibited from owning property worth $3,000 
or more and was required to have the value of all pensions deducted from his 
estate on death. Pensions could be denied to those who had financially respon- 
sible relatives, failed to work when judged capable, had deserted their families, 
were tramps or beggars, disposed of  their property to qualify for a pension, 
were recipients of other government pensions, or were inmates. Given these 
strict requirements, the proportion of pensioners to persons of eligible age in 
1933 varied from less than 1 percent in Maryland to 22 percent in Arizona. 
Although these programs were passed by  state legislatures, they were not 
always statewide. Of  the thirty states and territories having old-age pension 
programs, in eleven the participation of a county in the program was optional. 
Even among those states that did have  mandatory county participation, the 
state would often establish only broad conditions on eligibility, determine the 
maximum  condition payable, and  leave  the funding and  administration to 
the county. 
Old-age pensions began to emerge as a political issue in the  1920s. The 
social insurance leadership launched systematic campaigns using grassroots 
legislative pressure exerted by  local clubs. For example, the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles’ Old Age Pension Commission cooperated with state federations of la- 
bor and with the National Old Age Pension Committee of  the United Mine 
Workers. They sponsored citywide public meetings to discuss old-age pen- 
sions. They organized an old-age pension club in every Indiana community 
with an “aerie.” They prepared old-age pension legislation for introduction in 
states such as Rhode Island and Ohio. Nonetheless, they were not as well orga- 
nized as Union army veterans, and relatively few states passed old-age pension 
laws before 1929. Among those that did, passage was rarely smooth. For ex- 
ample, the Pennsylvania bill enacted in  1923, after having been defeated in 
1921, was  declared unconstitutional in  1924. Although the  1925 legislature 
adopted a joint resolution to amend the constitution, two successive legisla- 
tures had to approve the constitutional amendment, and the resolution failed in 
1927. Groups opposed to the Pennsylvania old-age pension scheme included 
the National Civic Association, the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Pennsylvania Manufacturers  Association.  The latter argued that an old- 
age pension plan would necessitate either a tax on manufacturers, an income 
tax, or both. While the opposition to old-age pensions gathered, the proponents 
of old-age pensions were divided by personal and organizational rivalries. At 
the end of the 1920s, Abraham Epstein, one of the leaders of the old-age pen- 168  Chapter8 
sion movement, declared that “the leadership of the movement was silenced 
and interest waned” (quoted in Weaver 1982,56). 
The Great Depression revived the old-age pension movement and eroded 
opposition to old-age pensions among employers, trade unions, and the general 
population.  Older workers  were  more  likely  to be  unemployed  than  their 
younger counterparts. Long periods of unemployment wiped out people’s sav- 
ings. Many private and trade union pension plans were discontinued; others 
curtailed benefits. Unemployed children and relatives could no longer shoulder 
the burden of caring for the elderly. The middle-class elderly risked becoming 
dependent on outdoor relief or on the almshouse, an institution increasingly 
regarded as inhumane and more costly than old-age pensions. As public sym- 
pathy for the elderly increased, many politicians became convinced that there 
was broadly based support for old-age pensions. While governor of New York, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt noted, “Judging by the number of letters I am re- 
ceiving, there is a more widespread popular interest . . . than most of us people 
in public life had realized” (cited in Haber and Gratton 1994, 137). Whereas 
only eleven states and territories passed old-age pension bills between  1915 
and 1929, after 1929 nineteen states and territories did. Compared to the bills 
passed before 1930, those passed after 1929 were more likely to be mandatory, 
to be administered by the state, and to use state funds, sometimes in combina- 
tion with county funds. 
The year  1933 marks the creation of popular, grassroots old-age pension 
movements. The elderly began to wield some of the political might of Union 
army veterans. In 1933 Upton Sinclair, the socialist author, proposed a glorified 
barter scheme as a solution to the depression, in which he also advocated giv- 
ing pensions of $50.00 per month to all needy persons who had lived in Cali- 
fornia for at least three years. This proposal would have reduced the minimum 
pensionable  age by  ten  years, raised  the  average monthly  grant  by  nearly 
$30.00 to 58 percent of the average earnings of full-time employees, lowered 
the residence  requirement  by  twelve years, and eliminated  citizenship and 
character requirements. At the same time Dr. Townsend, a California physi- 
cian, proposed another economic cure in which $200 per month, more than 
twice the earnings of full-time employees, would be given to every person in 
the United States sixty years of  age or older, provided the person spent the 
money within a month of receiving it. The plan would be financed by a transac- 
tions tax. Townsend described one of the advantages of his plan as giving the 
elderly “time to enjoy life and gain the full advantage from recreation, politi- 
cal, and civil life, and have time to travel and get fresh viewpoints without 
keeping their noses to the grindstone” (quoted in Putnam 1970,53). 
Both plans achieved political popularity. Upton Sinclair won the Democratic 
nomination for governor, and the Democratic party platform was an abbrevi- 
ated version of his program. However, Sinclair was soon deserted by influential 
Democrats, and he never pushed the old-age pension issue in the campaign on 
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social insurance law at the next session of Congress. What is more, he labeled 
the Townsend plan a complete delusion. In contrast, Governor Merriam, the 
Republican candidate, summoned a special session of the legislature, in which 
he secured passage of a resolution memorializing Congress to pass a national 
old-age pension law and recommending that the Townsend plan be studied by 
the federal government. He won the support of the Townsend press. Haight, a 
progressive Republican and a candidate of the Commonwealth Party, said of 
the Townsend plan, “The best way  to see whether it’s any good is to try it” 
(quoted in Putnam 1970,41). On election day, Merriam won 48 percent of the 
vote, to Sinclair’s 37 percent and Haight’s 13 percent. The Sinclair movement 
survived, but it shifted its focus to pensions and continued to nominate or en- 
dorse candidates for office until 1947. 
The Townsend movement had an impressive grassroots organization. Town- 
send clubs were rapidly organized, in part because district organizers were 
allowed to keep 20-40  percent of the twenty-five-cent enrolling fee of all new 
members. The Townsend National Weekly had a circulation of 300,000.  A 1936 
Gallup poll found that  14 percent of  California voters favored payments of 
$200 per month to the aged, and George Gallup concluded that the Townsen- 
dites probably did hold the balance of power between the Republican and the 
Democratic parties in the state (Putnam 1970,57).  The Townsend organization 
used its power mainly to induce the California legislature to send memorials 
to Congress requesting passage of Townsend’s legislation. They flooded anti- 
Townsend legislators with letters and telegrams until a memorial resolution was 
passed. Once it was passed, Townsendism ceased to be a decisive  political factor 
in California. A new Townsend party was launched in 1938 whose main pur- 
pose was to elect California congressmen sympathetic to the plan, but in 1942 
the party failed to receive the minimum vote necessary to remain on the ballot. 
Despite pressures from the elderly and other citizens for the passage of more 
generous old-age pension laws, there was little that state legislatures could do. 
Because the depression was shrinking the tax base, they could not finance new 
or expanded relief programs. In  California, fifty-six hundred persons were 
drawing state pensions in 1930, but by  1934 the number had risen to eighteen 
thousand. Increased demand for pensions led to benefit cuts. Whereas the aver- 
age monthly pension in June 1933 was $22.00, the average monthly pension 
in June 1934 was $20.00. Other states cut benefits as well, refused to take on 
new pensioners, and sometimes suspended pension payments until their fund- 
ing situation improved. 
The financial difficulties of  the states led to demands for federal participa- 
tion in state old-age pension programs, and assistance for the elderly poor be- 
came a major election-year issue in 1934. But federal subsidies for old-age 
assistance became available only with the Social Security Act of  1935. By 
insisting that old-age assistance be part of  a comprehensive Social Security 
Insurance package, Roosevelt was  able to use old-age assistance, as well as 
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Age Insurance. States were promised that the federal government would pay 
50 percent  of  any  Old Age Assistance pension  that was $30.00 per  month 
or less. Witte, a member  of  the  Committee on Economic Security, doubted 
“whether any part of the social security program other than the old-age assis- 
tance title would have been enacted into law but for the fact that the President 
throughout insisted that the entire program must be kept together. Had the mea- 
sure been  represented in separate bills, it is quite possible  that the old-age 
assistance title might have become law much earlier” (quoted in Weaver 1982, 
77). The Great Depression provided  social reformers with a unique political 
opportunity to enact comprehensive social legislation. 
Twelve months after the passage of the Social Security Act, thirty-six states 
and the District of Columbia had developed plans for old-age assistance pro- 
grams and were receiving money. Even before the act was passed, the Califor- 
nia legislature  had passed  a bill empowering the governor to accept federal 
funds if  offered and liberalizing the conditions for the receipt of  a pension. 
The primary  beneficiaries of federal subsidization of  old-age assistance pro- 
grams were  nonsouthern  states, particularly  those  with  large proportions  of 
dependent aged. Only the nonsouthern states already had old-age pension pro- 
grams, and expenditures were disproportionately concentrated within certain 
states. In  1933  California, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and 
Ohio accounted for 90 percent of all state expenditures on old-age pensions 
and housed 83 percent of all pensioners. Injections of federal money rapidly 
increased total expenditures. In California fewer than seventeen thousand el- 
derly individuals were receiving pensions in June 1934, but by December 1938 
more than  125,000 were. In  1934-35  total expenditures for old-age pensions 
in  the state were less than  $5 million, but by  1938-39  they  were  over $49 
million. Much of the increase in expenditures was accounted for by larger indi- 
vidual pensions. The average pension rose from $20.00 per month in June to 
$32.43 per month in December 1938. 
The infusion of federal funds did not fully resolve the recurrent financial 
crises that led to temporary suspensions in pension payments, particularly  in 
those states that depended wholly or in part on county funding. For example, 
in California the average monthly pension rose from $3  1.46 to $33.40 between 
July and September 1937 but by May 1938 was down to $32.30.01d-age pen- 
sions therefore still remained a political  issue. The California Ham and Eggs 
movement, which promised thirty one-dollar warrants to be issued every week 
to unemployed Californians age fifty or over, was able to collect enough votes 
to put an amendment on the  1938 ballot  and gained electoral success when 
Democratic candidates who supported the amendment won  the election for 
governor, lieutenant governor, and the U.S. Senate. Although  Ham and Eggs 
ballot initiatives were twice voted down by  the electorate, in 1940 California 
had the second highest average monthly pension in the nation and, thanks to 
the efforts of new lobbying groups, the highest average monthly pension in the 
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Figures 8.2 and 8.3 illustrate the national pattern in 1940 and 1950. In 1940 
states such as California, Massachusetts, and New York, which had the highest 
old-age pensions in 1933, were still among the states with the highest Old Age 
Assistance payments. The southern states, who had no old-age programs in 
1933, uniformly had the lowest pensions of all. Although average wage earn- 
ings in the South were lower than the national average, lower earnings cannot 
explain the pattern, which persists even when payments are adjusted for state 
cost of living. Quadagno (1988, 125-51) argues that southern states kept aver- 
age pensions low out of fear that old-age pensions might subsidize whole black 
families, thereby raising labor costs in cotton agriculture. In 1946, when the 
formula determining subsidization of Old Age Assistance was changed so that 
the federal government began to subsidize 80 percent of  the first $25.00 per 
month and 50 percent of all amounts above $25.00 up to $30.00 per month, 
the southern states responded by  increasing the average number of recipients 
rather than the average payment. Often payments that had formerly been given 
jointly to husbands and wives were now  split between the two. For example, 
Georgia increased the fraction of all beneficiaries from 18 percent of the el- 
derly population to 46 percent between 1940 and 1950, when the 1950 national 
average was  only 22 percent. In contrast, northern states raised the average 
payment. As seen in figure 8.3, southern payments were still low in 1950. Loui- 
siana, with its Populist politics, and Florida, with its unusually large elderly 
population, were the exceptions. 
Yearly  Pension I  $90-$145  $160-$220 
$230 -  $290  ggsHgs $300-$350 
rn  $400 and Over 
Fig. 8.2  Average yearly old-age assistance payment, 1940 
Note:  Average pension values are from Friedberg (1996). 172  Chapter8 
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Fig. 8.3  Average yearly old-age assistance payment, 1950 
Note:  Average pension values are from Friedberg (1996). 
The proportion of elderly within a state partially accounts for the pattern in 
state payments. Together, region of residence and the percentage of the popula- 
tion older than sixty-four account for 50 and 60 percent of the state variation 
in Old Age Assistance payments in 1940 and 1950, respectively. The average 
pension payment rose with the relative size of  the elderly population, but in- 
creases were more rapid at low percentages. Had the elderly constituted 20 
percent of  a state’s population, old-age payments probably would have fallen 
with further increases in the size of  the elderly population, although this is 
impossible to determine with certainty because the elderly never represented 
more than 10 percent of a state’s population. 
The Old Age Assistance program was at its peak in 1950. Twenty-eight mil- 
lion Americans, or 22 percent of the elderly population, received Old Age As- 
sistance benefits. By the end of  1950 the liberalization of Old Age and Survi- 
vors Insurance had already led to declines in the number of Old Age Assistance 
recipients. By  1960 only 14 percent of the elderly population were collecting 
Old Age Assistance benefits, and by  1988, when Old Age Assistance had be- 
come Supplemental Security Income, less than 7 percent were (Myers 1993, 
819-22).  Quadagno (1988, 146) argues that, faced with a changing economy, 
one no longer as heavily dependent on cotton agriculture, southern congress- 
men played a critical role in effecting transformation from Old Age Assistance 
to Old Age and Survivors Insurance. Liberalization of Old Age and Survivors 
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the federal government. Between 1940 and 1950 combined federal and state 
real expenditures on Old Age Assistance rose by  84 percent. Combined real 
expenditures rose by  only 3 percent between 1950 and 1960 even though the 
average Old Age Assistance payment became more generous. Between 1950 
and 1960 the total number of state pensioners fell from 22 to 14 percent of the 
elderly population, but the percentage of the elderly receiving Social Security 
Old Age Insurance payments rose from 17 to 62 percent. 
8.3  Social Security 
As enacted in 1935, Social Security Old Age Insurance was a simple pro- 
gram of limited scope that resembled private insurance. It covered all employ- 
ees under age sixty-five in industry and commerce other than railroad workers, 
thus excluding agricultural workers, government workers, domestic workers, 
and the self-employed. Only about 43 percent of the labor force was covered. 
Monthly benefits were payable only to retired workers when they reached age 
sixty-five. If a worker died before reaching age sixty-five or attained age sixty- 
five without meeting the eligibility criteria, he received a “money-back guaran- 
tee” equal to the contributions he had paid into the system plus interest. The 
benefit formula was  based on cumulative wage credits and slightly favored 
lower-income workers. An  individual was to be ineligible to receive benefits 
in any month in which he received covered wages. The combined employer- 
employee tax rate was to rise in three-year steps of  1 percent each from 2 
percent on the first $3,000 in earnings in  1937-39  to 6 percent in 1949 and 
thereafter. Benefits would not be paid until  1942. While taxes would be paid 
into the system, a large fund would accumulate, and by  1949 interest earnings 
and tax revenues would support the system indefinitely. 
As enacted in 1935, Social Security Old Age Insurance sought to be actuari- 
ally fair across generations. According to the U.S. Committee on Economic 
Security (1935), Old Age Assistance would “meet the problem of millions of 
persons who are already superannuated or shortly will be so and are without 
sufficient income for a decent subsistence.” Old Age Insurance was to be for 
younger workers and was necessary because without “a contributory system 
the cost of pensions, would, in the future, be overwhelming” (p. 25). Secretary 
of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau argued before the Committee on Ways and 
Means in 1935, “There are some who believe that we can meet this problem 
as we go by  borrowing from the future to pay the costs. . . . They would place 
all confidence in the taxing power of the future to meet the needs as they arise. 
We do not share this view. We cannot safely expect future generations to con- 
tinue to divert such large sums to the support of the aged unless we lighten the 
burden upon the future in other directions. . . .  We desire to establish this sys- 
tem on such sound foundations that it can be continued indefinitely in the fu- 
ture” (quoted in Weaver 1982, 85). 
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before benefits began to be paid. The 1939 amendments to the Social Security 
Act replaced the “money-back guarantee” with monthly benefits for survivors 
and dependents, modified the basis of the benefit formula in favor of cohorts 
approaching  retirement,  and  modified  the  benefit  formula  to  favor  lower- 
income workers and to favor workers with larger families while reducing bene- 
fits to single retirees, workers who died without an eligible survivor, and work- 
ers who would not eventually become eligible for benefits. Workers could now 
earn up to $15.00 per week without losing their benefits. Benefits were now to 
be paid in 1940, and the  1 percentage point increase in the payroll tax that was 
scheduled to take place in 1940 was repealed. 
By abandoning actuarial principles the Social Security Board was able to 
ensure the survival of its program. Old Age Insurance faced several challenges 
in the early years of  its existence.  It was a major political issue in the  1936 
election, and the Republican platform called for replacing Old Age Insurance 
with  a greatly  expanded  old-age assistance program  based  on  need  and  fi- 
nanced by both federal and state governments using a broadly based tax. The 
Townsend movement denounced the program, and Senator Long’s scheme to 
provide pensions for the poor elderly through  taxes of  100 percent on large 
incomes, inheritances, and property was gaining attention. The unspent surplus 
soon became  a liability  for Social Security  supporters. It was created  with 
money taken from workers during a depression and would provide the govern- 
ment with an unprecedented  degree of control over investment in the private 
economy. Because it provided the government with an easy market for its debt, 
it would encourage other types of  government  spending. Detractors also ar- 
gued that surpluses would encourage program liberalization and thus defeat all 
efforts at planning for the future. According to Senator Vandenburg (a Michi- 
gan Republican), “Such a treasure-all  in one place and conveniently eligible 
for Congressional raids throughout the years-is  an utterly naive conception” 
(quoted Berkowitz  1991, 41). A pay-as-you-go  system would have none  of 
these problems. 
Subsequent liberalization of  eligibility requirements  and benefit increases 
without matching payroll tax increases effectively  turned Old Age Insurance 
into a pay-as-you-go system and won it widespread political support. The his- 
tory of the subsequent amendments and the politics surrounding them is rela- 
tively well known, and accounts can be found in Achenbaum (1986), Berkow- 
itz  (1991),  Myers  (1993),  and Weaver  (1982),  among  others.  Therefore,  I 
summarize the changes only briefly, highlighting the salient features. 
Between  1950 and 1960 Social Security expanded rapidly, particularly dur- 
ing election years. Figure 8.4 illustrates some of the changes. The average real 
benefit paid to retired workers rose by  46 percent, after having fallen in the 
previous decade. Coverage increased sharply between  1949 and 1954, from 55 
percent of the labor force to 7 1 percent. By 1960  almost 80 percent of the labor 
force was covered. This increase in program coverage provided revenue that 
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vided by increases in the payroll tax. Combined employee-employer taxes rose 
from 3 to 6 percent, no more than originally planned, but now the taxes were 
to finance much more generous benefits. Taxes on the self-employed rose from 
zero in 1950, when they were not covered, to 4.5 percent in 1960. The program 
that in 1950 had represented less than 2 percent of total federal expenditures 
represented 11 percent in  1960. 
The expansion of Social Security between 1950 and 1960 arose in part from 
the lobbying efforts of trade unions and of such groups as Americans for Dem- 
ocratic Action and in part from congressmen’s desire to ease welfare burdens 
in their home states. In House hearings on the extension of Social Security to 
farmworkers, the public welfare commissioner of Alabama testified, “We have 
larger and larger numbers of needy old people and correspondingly smaller 
numbers within the population who can earn and pay taxes. Not only do we 
have an increasing number of old people, but we are a state with an unusually 
high proportion of children. . . .  Our rate of application for aid also continues to 
be as high, and there is less and less demand for unskilled and older workers” 
(Quadagno 1988, 147). California and New  York,  two politically  powerful 
states, and Rhode Island and New Jersey established state-run temporary dis- 
ability programs in the 1940s. The real costs of these programs grew by  close 
to  240  percent  from  1950 until  1956, when  federal  disability  insurance 
was enacted (estimated from Merriam and Skolnick 1968, 207-9,  tables 2-1 
and 2-2). 
The expansion of  Social Security continued until 1973. In  1961 age sixty- 
two was adopted as an early retirement age, with reduced benefits. As seen in 
figure 8.4, the average real benefit for retired men rose by  almost 50 percent 
between  1960 and 1973, with half the increase occurring between  1970 and 
1973. A retired worker and his wife who had paid less than $30.00 per month 
in taxes before 1970 might in  1973 be collecting Social Security benefits of 
$800 per month. Many of the amendments that increased Social Security bene- 
fits also increased state aid for Old Age Assistance, which in  1974 became 
incorporated into Supplemental Security Income. Medicare, a program for 
those older than sixty-four consisting of  a hospital insurance component fi- 
nanced by compulsory taxes and a voluntary supplementary medical insurance 
program subsidized out of general revenues, was enacted in  1965. The net re- 
sult was that Old Age and Survivors, Disability, and Hospital Insurance com- 
bined almost doubled its share of all federal expenditures from 11 percent in 
1960 to 21 percent in 1973. 
Prior to the enactment of Medicare, the health insurance issue dominated all 
others in the early 1960s. Of course, the health insurance debates have an even 
longer history. In the 1910s there were campaigns at the state level for compul- 
sory health insurance for wage earners. During the New Deal, and during the 
Truman years, both national and state health insurance plans were defeated, 
but less comprehensive forms of assistance were enacted. In the 1940s some 
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cal institutions and to cover private medical care of  many kinds. The  1950 
amendments to the Social Security Act permitted welfare departments to use 
federal matching funds for cash assistance to negotiate for care with pre- 
payment and insurance plans. A 1955 California report declared, “The medical 
needs of Old-Age Security recipients and the manner of meeting them consti- 
tute a problem which is increasingly predominant” (quoted in Putnam 1970, 
134). In real terms state and local expenditures on vendor medical payments 
rose by almost 130 percent between 1950 and 1956. In 1956 additional federal 
funds became available for medical vendor payments on a 50 percent federal 
matching basis up to a specific per capita limit. But these did not begin to pay 
for the cost of medical payments in states with more generous programs. Real 
state expenditures on vendor medical payments rose by  an additional 22 per- 
cent between 1956 and  1960 (estimated from Merriam and Skolnick 1968, 
207-9,  tables 2-1 and 2-2). In 1960 further relief became available to the states 
when the Kerr-Mills program specified that the federal government would pay 
between 50 and 80 percent (with higher percentages going to poorer states) of 
the costs of welfare medicine programs aimed at the aged poor. State and local 
expenditures on medical assistance for the aged rose by more than 1,000 per- 
cent between  1960 and  1965 (estimated from Merriam and Skolnick 1968, 
207-9,  tables 2-1 and 2-2). 
State governments were not the only ones lobbying for an expanded federal 
role in providing the aged with medical care. Unlike previous legislative  battles 
over amendments to the Social Security Act, the battle over Medicare turned 
the elderly into active campaigners. When a Senate subcommittee on aging 
held hearings around the country in  1959, one staff member later recalled, 
“The old folks lined up by the dozen everyplace we went. . .  .  And they didn’t 
talk much about housing or recreational centers or part-time work. They talked 
about medical care” (cited in Starr 1982, 368). Within two years congressmen 
were reporting more mail on the subject than on any other pending legislation 
(Starr 1982,368). 
By  the end of  the 1960s, the elderly had become a well-organized group. 
The director of  a senior center in New York  City (cited in Pratt  1976, 72) 
reported, “Ten years ago [the mid-1950~1  we couldn’t get politicians from the 
major parties to come talk to our people. They weren’t interested. . . . But in 
1960, things began to change. They began to make an effort to come when 
invited. And today [1966] we frequently have to throw them out when they 
come-as  they frequently do-uninvited,  to campaign and distribute litera- 
ture. Politicians now realize that the elderly represent a large number of votes, 
that they do vote, and that they have needs and desires.” Senior citizen centers, 
like the local chapters of the Union army veterans’ organization, thus served 
to organize the elderly in a voting bloc. Many senior citizen groups gained 
access to key policy makers. One staff member of the American Association 
of  Retired Persons (AARP) interviewed by  Pratt (1976,  147-48)  reported, 
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a staff man, Evans was his name, assigned to dealing with old-age problems. 
He kept us informally  apprised  of  White House thinking, and they wouldn’t 
make a move on a major old-age issue without first consulting AARP.” 
The final large legislated increase in the Social Security Act came in 1972, 
when  Congress raised  benefits  across the board  by  20 percent  and adopted 
automatic cost-of-living adjustments for Social Security benefits. This increase 
was enacted when both parties were trying to reduce national  spending and 
when nationally prominent actuaries, such as Robert Myers, former chief actu- 
ary of  the Social Security system, warned that the proposed changes would 
burden future generations. But a large trust fund surplus combined with the 
political pressure exerted by senior citizen groups led to large benefit increases. 
According to a staff member of the House Ways and Means Committee inter- 
viewed  by  Pratt  (1976,  160), “The trust  fund  allowed  a large  increase and 
there’s no doubt about that. . . . But the increase which was finally proposed 
would not have been as high if the NCSC [National Council of Senior Citizens] 
and other senior-citizen groups hadn’t pushed for it on the Hill and the [White 
House] conference [on aging].” By adopting automatic cost-of-living adjust- 
ments, congressmen may have hoped to lessen the constant pressure from se- 
nior citizen groups to increase benefits. 
Liberalization  of  Social Security from  1960 to 1973 was financed both out 
of the trust fund and by increasing tax rates and the ceiling on taxable earnings. 
The combined employer-employee  tax rate rose from 6 to 9.7 percent, with 
payments toward Hospital Insurance bringing the total tax to I I .7 percent (see 
fig. 8.5). After 1967 increasing the ceiling on taxable earnings became the most 
common way of financing program expansion. The ceiling on taxable earnings 
had remained $3,000 from 1935 to 1951 and in real terms exceeded the  1938 
level only in  1968. But  from 1966 to  1976 the ceiling on taxable earnings 
increased by 34 percent in real terms (see fig. 8.5). Weaver (1982, 160) argues 
that, because by  1965 compulsory coverage had been extended to the higher- 
paid, self-employed professionals, increases in the ceiling on taxable earnings 
after  1965 financed  benefit  increases for current beneficiaries  without  bur- 
dening the average taxpayer and the near elderly. 
Although Social Security did not unfold as originally planned by the Com- 
mittee on Economic Security, current coverage levels and benefits would have 
come as no surprise to the original planners. Miron and Weil (1998) estimate 
that, under the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act, a same-age couple 
retiring in 1990 in which the husband had annual wages of $1,000 per year and 
a continuous work history would have 60 percent of earnings replaced by So- 
cial Security benefits and would have earned a 4 percent rate of return. In 1990 
the actual replacement rate for such a couple was 61 percent and their rate of 
return 6 percent. Of course, if the value of Medicare benefits were included, the 
replacement rate would be much higher. But the members of the Committee on 
Economic Security had hoped that a system of national health insurance would 
















Fig. 8.5  Tax ceiling on earnings (in 1967 dollars) and combined employer-employee  tax 
rate, 1937-93 
Note: From Myers (1993, 131-32). 180  Chapter8 
tee on Economic Security is the current level of  the combined employer- 
employee tax rate. Had there been no changes to the Social Security system 
after the 1939 amendments, the tax rate in 1990 would have been 6 percent. 
Instead, it was more than  11 percent, largely because until  1960 the tax rate 
was much lower than projected by  the committee. Increases in benefits were 
financed, not by  increasing the tax rate, but by  depleting the trust fund. 
The rapid expansion of  Social Security between  1960 and 1973 produced 
the first financial crisis facing Social Security. These problems were com- 
pounded by  the use of a benefit formula that overadjusted for inflation. This 
indexation problem was fixed in  1977, cutting the Social Security wealth of 
younger relative to older cohorts by  13 percent. But this was not enough, and 
by  late  1982 it was unclear whether the Old Age and  Survivors Insurance 
program would be able to meet benefit payments. This short-range financing 
problem was resolved by  implementing scheduled tax increases earlier than 
originally planned, by  including more fringe benefits (such as deferred com- 
pensation) as covered wages, by  taxing the benefits of  upper-income Social 
Security recipients with taxes going directly to the Social Security trust fund, 
and by modifying the cost-of-living adjustment formula. At the same time, the 
age at which full benefits are received was  to increase incrementally from 
sixty-five to sixty-seven between 2005 and 2025. This solution, however, main- 
tains the system’s fiscal solvency only until at most 2029, at which point the 
large numbers of the retired elderly relative to workers will have  consumed 
the trust fund. Financing the Social Security retirement and disability system 
thereafter with incoming tax revenues alone would require taxes greater than 
17 percent of taxable payroll. An additional 7 percent of taxable payroll would 
be needed to finance Hospital Insurance. Expenditures on Old Age and Survi- 
vors Disability Insurance and Hospital Insurance combined would be greater 
than 10 percent of GDP. Further reforms are therefore needed to maintain the 
system’s solvency. 
8.4  Fixing Social Security 
The 1910 Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions predicted that, 
if old-age pensions were passed, “There would be constant political pressure 
to increase the amount of pensions, to lower the age limit, to make the adminis- 
tration laxer” (p. 238). The history of the Union army pension program, of state 
old-age pension programs, and of  Social Security old-age insurance proves 
that the commission’s expectation was realistic. All programs began modestly, 
covering only a limited group of  individuals, and the Social Security old-age 
insurance program was even based on sound actuarial principles. All became 
enormous undertakings far removed from actuarial principles. Although some 
of  their growth was  spurred by  well-organized pressure groups, such tactics 
were effective only when revenue sources were available. Had the federal gov- 
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program would have been so generous. States showed no inclination to develop 
generous programs until they were able to obtain federal financing for their 
activities. The existence of a large trust fund and the possibility of financing 
current benefits by increasing revenue through increases in program coverage, 
tax increases, and increases in the tax ceiling permitted the federal government 
to finance an extremely generous Social Security program. 
The growth of Social Security crowded out other forms of social spending. 
Politicians, responsive to the pressure of  both interest groups and voting tax- 
payers, need to compare the costs and benefits in votes or campaign donations 
of increasing the total tax burden with raising new tax revenue to redistribute 
to a given group. Interest groups are therefore competing for public-sector re- 
sources. Poterba (1996) finds that  an  increasing proportion of  the elderly 
within a state jurisdiction is associated with a reduction in per child educa- 
tional spending. Lindert (1994) concludes from cross-country evidence that a 
similar pattern held in the past as well. 
As  the Social Security trust fund becomes depleted, it is unlikely that in 
the future the program will be as generous.  Although recent polls suggest that 
individuals favor raising taxes to maintain benefits, as the proportion of  the 
elderly to taxpayers increases, although they may still be willing to finance a 
system that protects the elderly against hardships, taxpayers may be less will- 
ing to finance a system that provides for a long and, for many, a recreation- 
filled retirement. Social reformers at the beginning of the century believed that 
old-age pensions would provide for “a few years before death when they [wage 
earners] will no longer be able to earn wages” (Ohio Health and Old Age Insur- 
ance Commission 1919, 201). In  a  1938 radio address President Roosevelt 
stated, “The [Social Security]  Act does not offer anyone, either individually or 
collectively,  an easy life-nor  was it ever intended so to do. None of the sums 
of money paid out to individuals in assistance or insurance will spell anything 
approaching abundance. But they will furnish that minimum necessary to keep 
a foothold; and that is the kind of protection Americans want” (National Con- 
ference on Social Welfare 1985, 148). 
Social Security alone has never provided individuals with an abundant re- 
tirement. But it has provided individuals with an income sufficient to meet 
modest needs. As the population grew richer and healthier, Social Security, 
when combined with pensions and other savings, began to provide for both a 
lengthy and a comfortable retirement. The living standards of the elderly have 
improved substantially.  Whereas in 1960  those older than sixty-four  were twice 
as likely to be living below the poverty line as the rest of the adult population, 
today they  are no more likely (Hurd 1994). When Social Security was first 
established, a twenty-year-old could expect to  spend  12 percent of  his re- 
maining life in retirement. Because of unexpected increases in life expectancy, 
he spent 22 percent of his life in retirement, part of it in recreational activities. 
If  improvements in life expectancy continue, a twenty-year-old today will 
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changes in the basic structure of Social Security, some combination of tax in- 
creases and benefits is therefore likely, but even more fundamental reforms 
have been proposed, including the complete privatization of Social Security. 
The idea that Social Security should be privatized, or, more accurately, trans- 
formed into a system of individual mandatory savings accounts, has recently 
attracted the attention of  economists and has been implemented in Chile. A 
scheme similar to that implemented in Chile would consist of mandatory sav- 
ings plans supplemented by minimum pension guarantees for those with suf- 
ficient years of coverage. During the transition period in Chile, savings flowed 
into the new individual retirement accounts rather than into the old pay-as-you- 
go social insurance system. Payments to retirees were met out of government 
revenue. Active workers received explicit government debt on account of past 
contributions. 
One advantage of a system of individual mandatory savings accounts would 
be that this new pension system would be insulated from political action to 
increase benefits without direct financing. Although awareness of  long-term 
trust fund problems is currently very high, the trust fund will be generating 
large, temporary surpluses on the order of over $1 trillion between 2005 and 
2020 (US. Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds 1996) at the same time that the Hospital 
Insurance trust fund may be facing continued difficulties. It may, therefore, be 
tempting to finance Medicare through the Old Age and Survivors Disability 
Insurance trust fund. Other temptations may  arise in the more distant future 
as well. 
Political pressure would not disappear completely under a system of manda- 
tory savings accounts. Because the government will have the decisive say in 
determining when and how accumulations can be converted into retirement 
annuities, voters might seek to reconfigure the system to meet their immediate 
needs. Because government restrictions on the portfolio holdings of retirement 
accounts are likely, there will be some political risk associated with leaving 
the government to pick and choose among different sectors and firms in the 
capital market. 
A disadvantage of replacing the current system with individual savings ac- 
counts would be the higher administrative costs resulting from the costs of 
soliciting and managing very small individual retirement accounts. An addi- 
tional  disadvantage  would  the  poorer  provision  of  insurance  over  varying 
lengths of the working life (see Diamond 1996). Unless an individual received 
an annuity based on the value of his contributions, he might run out of money 
if he lived longer than expected. Minimum pension guarantees would alleviate 
some of these problems, as would better estimates of life expectancy. 
The largest political hurdle to moving toward a system of individual savings 
accounts is financing the transition. Will one generation bear the brunt of the 
transition cost? The Chilean transition was financed out of a government sur- 
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vidual retirement accounts (Diamond 1996). Kotlikoff (1996) argues that, be- 
cause Social Security affects work  incentives, whether all generations in the 
United States can gain from the privatization  of Social Security depends on 
the initial tax structure, the linkage between Social Security benefits and taxes, 
and the type of tax used to finance the transition. Assuming that older genera- 
tions are fully compensated, then, under favorable circumstances, future gener- 
ations benefit as well, but, under unfavorable ones, they suffer a welfare de- 
cline.5 Feldstein (1996) argues that much of the gain from privatization would 
result from an increase in the rate of return. The transition would be financed 
by a bond issue that, while politically difficult to implement, would leave all 
generations better off. 
An alternative scenario to the immediate adoption of individual savings ac- 
counts is a gradual one. As both retirement and health benefits are cut, individ- 
uals who desire a long retirement  will need either to save more or to work 
longer. But, if they wish to save more, they will do so only if they are certain 
that the state will not provide for a lengthy retirement once they reach old age. 
Bernheim (1995) finds that individuals who expect to receive no Social Secu- 
rity  benefits  save substantially  more than individuals  who expect to receive 
reduced benefits, who in turn save more than those who expect to receive the 
same benefits as current retirees. He also finds that individuals’  decisions of 
how much to save are determined not by quantitative perceptions of financial 
need but by vague and unquantified senses of security and urgency. The retire- 
ment of well-to-do individuals is already privatized. For these individuals, pen- 
sion income, not Social Security payments, constitutes their primary source of 
retirement income. The immediate adoption of a system of individual accounts 
would serve a psychological function by breaking the link between the state 
and retirement. It would make individuals aware that the tax revenue to finance 
a lengthy retirement will not be forthcoming and that a lengthy retirement will 
be possible only if they provide for it. 
8.5  Summary 
In this chapter I have examined three different programs aimed at the el- 
derly: the Union army pension program, the state old-age pension  programs 
that later became Old Age Assistance, and Old Age and Survivors Insurance. 
All experienced rapid growth partially because well-organized  lobby groups 
were able to tap new sources of revenue and thus redistribute program costs. 
The South, the young, and recent immigrants bore the costs of a pension pro- 
gram benefiting Union army veterans. Property owners bore the costs of state 
old-age pension programs, and some states were able to redistribute the costs 
of Old Age Assistance to others. The costs of Old Age and Survivors Insurance 
and of Hospital Insurance have been borne by cohorts who have paid sizable 
Social Security taxes all their lives.h The tax revenue necessary to finance a 
lengthy retirement for the growing numbers of elderly is unlikely to be forth- 184  Chapter8 
coming. In the future, the provision for a lengthy retirement will lie with indi- 
viduals. 
Appendix 8A 
Table 8A.1  Total Number of Union Army Pensioners, Costs of Pension Program, 
and Pension Program as Percentage of All Federal 
Expenditures, 1865-1920 
Total Costs  Costs as 
Number of  B of All Federal 




















































































































































































27.14 Table 8A.1  (continued) 
Total Costs  Costs as 
Number of  % of All Federal 

































































































Source: See fig. 8.1. Compiled from Glasson  (1918a. 273). the US.  Bureau of  Pensions  1920 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions,  and table Y 335-338 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1975, 1104). 
Table 8A.2  Total Number of OASDI Beneficiaries, Average Monthly Benefits for Retired 
Men, Percentage of Labor Force Covered by OASDI, OASDHI as 
Percentage of All Federal Expenditures, 1937-93 
Number Beneficiaries in  Average Monthly 
1  ,OOOs  Benefit, Retired Men  OASDHI as % 
Year  All  Retired Men  Current $  1967 $  Covered  Expenditures 
% Labor Force  All Federal 
~~  ~ 
1938 
1939 
1940  222 
1941  434 
1942  598 
1943  748 
1944  955 
1945  1,288 
1946  1,642 
1947  1,978 
1948  2,315 
1949  2,743 
1950  3,477 














23.17  55.17 
23.32  52.88 
23.71  48.59 
24.17  46.66 
24.48  46.45 
24.94  46.27 
25.30  43.25 
25.68  38.37 
25.21  34.97 
26.92  37.70 
45.67  63.34 











.23 Table 8A.2  (continued) 
Number Beneficiaries in  Average Monthly 
1,000s  Benefit, Retired Men 
% Labor Force 




































































































































































































































































































Source:  See fig. 8.4. Compiled from tables 5.A4, 5.B5, and 5.C2 in Social  Security Bulletin: Annual 
Statistical Supplernenr (1994, 197, 208, 214); Series H 48-56 in Kurian (1994, 131); Series Y 605-637 in 
U.S. Bureau of the Census ( 1975, 1124);  and various issues of Government Finances. 187  Pensions and Politics 
Notes 
I.  The total number of veterans on the rolls in 1910 was 562,615, of which 80 percent 
(450,092) were older than sixty-four. Sixty-three percent of the wives of veterans were 
age sixty-five or older, suggesting that 354,447 women older than sixty-four benefited 
from the Union army program. In addition, if  63 percent of widows were older than 
sixty-four, an additional 183,590 women older than sixty-four benefited. All  mothers 
and parents can be assumed to be sixty-five years of age or older. Therefore, the total 
number of elderly benefiting from the pension program is 990,888, of an elderly popu- 
lation of 3,949,524. (Estimated from the 1910 census and the U.S. Bureau of Pensions 
1910 Report of  the Commissioner of  Pensions.) 
2.  There was no mention of interest payments in the act. 
3. For details, see Skocpol (1992), among others. 
4. For more detailed discussions, see Achenbaum (1983), Lubove (1968), Putnam 
(1970), Quadagno (1988), and Weaver (1982). 
5. Because Kotlikoff does not account for the value of Social Security insurance in 
his calculations, the benefits of moving to a privatized system may be lower than esti- 
mated. 
6. In theory, these cohorts may have increased bequests or transfers to their children 
to compensate them for the high Social Security taxes that they were paying, but we 
have no empirical evidence that this occurred. 